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Abstract
Strict privacy is of paramount importance
in distributed machine learning. Federated
learning, with the main idea of communicat-
ing only what is needed for learning, has been
recently introduced as a general approach
for distributed learning to enhance learning
and improve security. However, federated
learning by itself does not guarantee any pri-
vacy for data subjects. To quantify and con-
trol how much privacy is compromised in the
worst-case, we can use differential privacy.
In this paper we combine additively homo-
morphic secure summation protocols with
differential privacy in the so-called cross-
silo federated learning setting. The goal
is to learn complex models like neural net-
works while guaranteeing strict privacy for
the individual data subjects. We demon-
strate that our proposed solutions give pre-
diction accuracy that is comparable to the
non-distributed setting, and are fast enough
to enable learning models with millions of pa-
rameters in a reasonable time.
To enable learning under strict privacy guar-
antees that need privacy amplification by
subsampling, we present a general algorithm
for oblivious distributed subsampling. How-
ever, we also argue that when malicious par-
ties are present, a simple approach using
distributed Poisson subsampling gives better
privacy.
Finally, we show that by leveraging random
projections we can further scale-up our ap-
proach to larger models while suffering only
a modest performance loss.
1 Introduction
Privacy is increasingly important for modern machine
learning. Commonly, the sensitive data needed for
learning are distributed to different parties, such as in-
dividual hospitals and companies or IoT device owners.
Federated learning (FL) [35] has been recently intro-
duced in order to reduce the risks to privacy and im-
prove model training. The key idea in FL is that only
the information necessary for learning a model will be
communicated while the actual data stays distributed
on the individual devices.
FL makes attacking the system harder since no cen-
tralised server holds all the data. Nevertheless, it
has been recently demonstrated that FL by itself is
not enough to guarantee any level of privacy [48].
The current gold standard in privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning is differential privacy (DP) [17], which
is based on clear mathematical definitions and aims to
guarantee a level of indistinguishability for any indi-
vidual data subject: the results of learning would be
nearly the same if any single data entry was removed
or arbitrarily replaced with another.
In this paper, we concentrate on FL with DP to enable
efficient learning on distributed data while guarantee-
ing strong privacy. We focus on the so-called cross-silo
FL [28], where the number of parties might range from
a few to tens of thousands, and each party generally
holds from tens to some thousands of samples of data.
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Additionally, we consider using trusted execution en-
vironments (TEEs) as an extra layer of security.
To guarantee strict privacy with good utility, it is often
vital that privacy can be amplified by the stochastic-
ity resulting from using data subsampling [29]. This
requires that the origin of the samples in a minibatch
remains hidden from other parties. We therefore intro-
duce an algorithm that enables oblivious distributed
subsampling with an arbitrary sampling scheme.
The two most used sampling schemes with privacy am-
plification are sampling without replacement, where
the minibatch size is fixed and each sample has equal
probability of being included, and Poisson sampling,
where the probability of independently including each
sample is fixed and the batch size varies. We show
that when malicious parties are present, using a simple
distributed Poisson sampling scheme generally gives
better privacy than using a more complex distributed
sampling without replacement scheme.
Finally, we argue both theoretically and on empiri-
cal grounds that by using random projections, we can
scale our methods up to even larger models while only
incurring a modest loss in prediction accuracy.
The code for all the experiments is freely available [20].
1.1 Contribution
We consider DP cross-silo FL in two settings: with
pairwise connections between the parties (feasible for
at most tens to hundreds of parties), and with connec-
tions to central servers (hundreds to tens of thousands
of parties).
We present and empirically test two methods based on
combining fast secure multiparty-computation (SMC)
protocols and DP, with emphasis on iterative learn-
ing and distributed subsampling. The methods can be
used for learning complex models such as neural net-
works from large datasets under strict privacy guar-
antees, with reasonable computation and communica-
tion capacities. The proposed method without pair-
wise connections is based on a novel secure summation
algorithm, preliminarily presented in an earlier confer-
ence publication [21].
For achieving privacy amplification by subsampling
in the distributed setting, we propose an algorithm
for oblivious subsampling under an arbitrary sampling
scheme. We also show that a simpler distributed Pois-
son sampling scheme is preferable to a more complex
scheme of distributed sampling without replacement,
when malicious parties are present.
To speed up encryption and reduce the amount of com-
munication needed, we also consider communicating
only randomly projected low-dimensional representa-
tions. We argue theoretically and show with experi-
ments that the effect on utility under DP is small.
2 Background
In the next sections we give a short review of the neces-
sary theory, starting with DP in Section 2.1, and con-
tinuing with random projections in Section 2.2, and
trusted execution environments in Section 2.3.
2.1 Differential privacy
Differential privacy [17, 15] has emerged as the leading
method for privacy-preserving machine learning. On
an intuitive level, DP guarantees a level of deniabil-
ity to each data subject: the results would be nearly
the same if any single individual’s data were replaced
with an arbitrary sample. More formally we have the
following:
Definition 2.1. (Differential privacy) A randomised
mechanism M : D → R is (, δ)-DP, if for all neigh-
bouring datasets D,D′ ∈ D : D ∼ D′ and for any
measurable E ⊆ R,
P (M(D) ∈ E) ≤ eP (M(D′) ∈ E) + δ,
where  > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1]. If δ = 0, the mechanism is
called (pure) -DP.
We consider two specific neighbouring relations: when
|D| = |D′| and they differ by a single element (so-
called bounded DP), the relation is called a substitu-
tion relation and denoted by ∼S . When one can be
transformed into the other by removing or adding a
single element (unbounded DP), the relation is called
a remove/add relation and is denoted by ∼R.
One very general method for guaranteeing DP is the
Gaussian mechanism, which amounts to adding inde-
pendent Gaussian noise to the learning algorithm. The
amount of privacy then depends on the sensitivity of
the function and the noise magnitude:
Definition 2.2. (Sensitivity) Let f : D → Rd. The
`2-sensitivity of f is defined as
∆ = sup
D,D′∈D:D∼D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2, (1)
where ∼ denotes a general neighbourhood relation.
Definition 2.3. (Gaussian mechanism) Let f : D →
Rd with sensitivity ∆. A randomised mechanism Gf :
D → Rd,
Gf (D) = f(D) +N (0, σ2 · Id) (2)
is called the Gaussian mechanism.
Composition refers to DP mechanism(s) accessing a
given dataset several times, which either weakens the
privacy guarantees or requires increasing the noise
magnitude guaranteeing privacy. No analytical for-
mula is known for the exact privacy guarantees pro-
vided by the Gaussian mechanism for a given number
of compositions when using data subsampling. How-
ever, as shown in [34, 30], they can be calculated nu-
merically with arbitrary precision.
In effect, for some function f , we can numerically
calculate the amount of privacy for a given number
of compositions when using the subsampled Gaussian
mechanism with a chosen sequence of noise values.
This is called privacy accounting. In practice, we use
the privacy loss accountant of [30] for all the actual
privacy calculations1.
2.2 Dimensionality reduction
Using SMC protocols is generally expensive in terms of
communication and computation, and even with faster
SMC protocols the overhead can be significant. We
therefore also consider dimensionality reduction by a
random projection to scale the methods to even larger
problems.
Instead of using SMC protocols to send a vector of di-
mension d, each party only communicates a projection
with dimension k s.t. k  d. The representation is
obtained using a random projection matrix generated
with a shared seed.
For the projection, we use a mapping fJL(u) =
PTu, P ∈ Rd×k s.t. each element of P is drawn inde-
pendently from N (0, 1/k). Given the low-dimensional
representation PTu and P , since EP [PPTu] = u, the
original vector u can be approximated as u ' PPTu.
Moreover, as shown in [12], with large enough k
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma [27] guarantees that
uTPPTu ' uTu. These properties explain our experi-
mental results in Section 4 showing that when training
under DP and with k  d, learning with projections
results in nearly the same prediction accuracy as using
full-dimensional gradients.
To guarantee privacy when the privacy mechanism op-
erates on a low-dimensional projection and the pro-
jection matrix is public, we first define sensitivity
bounded functions and then state the essential lemma,
both introduced in [3]:
Definition 2.4 (Function sensitivity). A randomised
function f : D → X is (∆f , δ)-sensitive, if for any
D,D′ ∈ D : D ∼ D′, there exist coupled random
variables X,X ′ ∈ X s.t. the marginal distributions of
1https://github.com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant
X,X ′ are identical to those of f(D), f(D′), and
PX,X′(‖X −X ′‖2 ≤ ∆f ) ≥ 1− δ.
Lemma 2.1. Let M : X → R be an (, δ)-DP mech-
anism for sensitivity ∆f queries, and let f : D → X
be a (∆f , δ
′)-sensitive function. Then the composed
mechanism M(f(D)) is (, δ + δ′)-DP.
2.3 Trusted execution environments
When the parties running the distributed learning pro-
tocols have enough computational resources available,
we can increase security by leveraging trusted execu-
tion environments (TEEs).
TEEs aim to provide a solution to the general prob-
lem of establishing a trusted computational environ-
ment by providing confidentiality, integrity, and attes-
tation for any computations run inside the TEE: no
adversary outside the environment should 1) be able
to gain any information about the computations done
inside it (confidentiality), nor 2) be able to influence
the computations done by the TEE (integrity), and
3) the TEE should be able to give an irrefutable and
unforgeable proof that the computation has been done
inside it (attestation) [41].
In effect, TEE provides a securely isolated area in
which users can store sensitive data and run the code
they want protected. TEE is realised with a support
of hardware, and it aims to protect applications from
software and hardware attacks. Currently, technolo-
gies such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
and ARM’s TrustZone are used for implementing TEE.
It should be emphasised that the security of TEEs de-
pends not only on software but also on the hardware
manufactures, and should not be generally accepted at
face value; various attacks targeting TEEs have been
reported, including arbitrary code executions [38? ]
and side-channel attacks [47, 44? ].
In this paper we assume TEEs are used by well-
resourced parties as detailed in Section 3. However,
we do not rely exclusively on TEEs for doing secure
computations, but only propose them as an additional
layer of security to make attacking the system harder.
3 DP cross-silo federated learning
In the general setting we consider, there are N data
holders (clients), the data x are horizontally parti-
tioned, i.e., each client has the same features, and the
ith client has ni data points. The privacy guarantees
are given on an individual sample level.
Our main focus is learning complex models using
gradient-based optimisation. Using the standard em-
pirical risk minimisation framework [45], given a loss
function L(h(x)), h ∈ H, where H is some function
class and x includes the target variable, we would like
to find h∗OPT = arg minh∈H L(h(x)). However, since
we do not know the underlying true data distribu-
tion, we instead minimise the average loss over data
hOPT = arg minh∈H 1/n
∑N
i=1
∑ni
j=1 L(h(xij)), where
n =
∑N
i=1 ni and xij refers to the jth sample from
client i.
The standard method for solving this problem with
privacy in the centralised setting is DP stochastic gra-
dient descent (DP-SGD) [40, 1]. In this case, on each
iteration we need to calculate
1/b[
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈[bi]
OθL˜(xij |θ) + η], (3)
where [b] = ∪i[bi] is the chosen batch of size b, OθL˜
is the clipped gradient of the loss, θ is the model pa-
rameter vector, and η is the noise that guarantees pri-
vacy (see Definition 2.3). In the following, we write
zij
∆
= OθL˜(xij |θ).
With small problems, (3) can be readily computed
with general secure multiparty computation protocols,
as done e.g. in [26]. In our case this is not feasi-
ble due to high computational and communication re-
quirements.
From the privacy perspective, an ideal distributed
learning algorithm would have DP noise magnitude
equal to the corresponding non-distributed learning al-
gorithm run by a single trusted party on the entire
combined dataset. We refer to this baseline as the
trusted aggregator version.
Another important property for distributed private
learning, that is mostly orthogonal to the amount of
noise added, is graceful degradation: when the pri-
vacy guarantees are affected by adversarial parties, we
want to avoid catastrophic failures where a single party
can (almost) completely break the privacy of others.
Instead, the privacy guarantees should degrade grace-
fully with the number of adversaries.
It is readily apparent from (3) that the problem can
be broken into two largely independent components:
distributed noise addition and secure summation. We
will consider these problems separately in sections 3.2
and 3.3, respectively.
3.1 Threat model
We allow for three types types of parties: honest, (non-
colluding) honest-but-curious (hbc) and malicious.
The only honest parties we include are TEEs. We
also consider the possibility of an adversary gaining
full control of some number of TEEs, which effectively
turns these into malicious parties.
The privacy guarantees of the methods are valid
against fully malicious parties, whereas the accuracy
of the results is only guaranteed with malicious parties
who avoid model poisoning attacks or disrupting the
learning altogether.
3.2 Distributed noise addition
In order to guarantee privacy, we need to add noise to
the sum as in (3). This can be done utilising infinite
divisibility of normally distributed random variables:
when client i adds Gaussian noise with variance σ2i the
total noise after summation is Gaussian with variance∑N
i=1 σ
2
i .
Given a target noise variance σ2, using TEEs we can
simply set σ2i = σ
2/N so the sum corresponds to the
trusted aggregator noise level. However, in case a TEE
is compromised, the attacker can remove 1/N fraction
of the noise from the results. This weakens the privacy
guarantees, but does not typically result in a sudden
catastrophic failure.
For the case without TEEs (or to protect against com-
promised TEEs with obvious modifications), we can
upscale the noise to introduce a trade-off between the
noise level and protection against colluders: assuming
T colluders, we need
σ2i ≥
1
N − T − 1σ
2
(see e.g. [21] for a proof).
The total noise level in this case is sub-optimal com-
pared to the trusted aggregator setting, but for mod-
erate T and larger N the noise level is still close to op-
timal. Even if the actual number of colluders exceeds
the parameter T used in the algorithm, the privacy
guarantees still weaken gracefully with the number of
malicious parties.
3.3 Secure summation
We consider two fast secure summation protocols. If
the number of clients is low (at most some dozens), we
can use fast homomorphic encryption based on secret
sharing using pairwise keys. The algorithm was origi-
nally introduced in [8], uses fixed-point representation
of real numbers, and is based on fast modulo-addition.
For convenience, we state the algorithm in the Ap-
pendix A, where we also detail our implementation
used in Section 4.
When the number of clients is larger, we instead use
the Distributed Compute Algorithm (DCA) given in
Algorithm 1 Distributed Compute Algorithm: secure
summation for a large number of clients
Require: Number of parties N (public);
Number of compute nodes M (public);
Upper bound for the total sum R (public);
yi integer held by client i, i = 1, . . . , N .
Ensure: Securely calculated sum
∑N
i=1 yi.
1: Each client i simulates M − 1 vectors uil of uni-
formly random integers at most R, and sets uiM =
−∑M−1l=1 uil mod R.
2: Client i computes the messages mi1 = yi + ui1
mod R, mil = uil, l = 2, . . .M , and sends them
securely to the corresponding compute node.
3: After receiving messages from all of the clients,
compute node l broadcasts the noisy aggregate
sums ql =
∑N
i=1mil. A final aggregator will then
add these to obtain
∑M
l=1 ql mod R =
∑N
i=1 yi.
Algorithm 1, which we originally presented in a pre-
liminary conference paper [21]. DCA is based on se-
cret sharing using intermediate servers, called compute
nodes, that do the actual summations. As before, real
numbers are represented in fixed-point. The code on
the compute server side could be run inside TEEs, if
available, to increase security.
In detail, we assume there are M separate compute
nodes, and use additive secret sharing for the summa-
tion, where the necessary number of shares for recon-
structing the secret is M. The security of the method
relies on at least one of the nodes being honest-but-
curious, i.e., not colluding with the others. As a setup,
client i runs a standard key-exchange with each of the
compute nodes to establish shared keys for some sym-
metric encryption.
The shares uil, l = 1, . . . ,M − 1 should be generated
from the discrete uniform distribution bounded by R.
In the proposed method, the main setup cost is the key
exchange protocol each client needs to run with the
compute nodes. The main computational cost is typ-
ically incurred in generating the shares, and the com-
munication scales linearly with the number of compute
nodes.
To avoid possible bottlenecks on the compute nodes
when N is very large, we can increase M while having
each client only send messages to some smaller subset
of the nodes. In this case at least one node in each sub-
set needs to be non-colluding to maintain the privacy
guarantees.
Algorithm 2 Create a list of tokens
Require: Each party i has random integers rij , j =
1, . . . , ni called tokens that are all unique, and only
i knows who rij belongs to. There is a shared (ar-
bitrary) ordering over the parties, assumed w.l.o.g.
to be 1, . . . , N . All parties know the public keys
of all other parties.
1: Party i encrypts all it’s tokens with the public
keys of all parties according to the ordering: rij →
Enck1(Enck2(. . . EnckN (rij) . . . )), j = 1, . . . , ni
2: All parties publish all encrypted values to form a
list with some ordering.
3: for i = 1 to N do
4: Party i decrypts layer i from all the messages
on the current list, randomly permutes the ele-
ments, and publishes the resulting new list.
5: end for
6: Returns a list of tokens rij , i = 1, . . . , N, j =
1, . . . , ni s.t. only the owner of a token knows who
it belongs to.
3.4 Learning with minibatches
For iterative learning, sub-sampling is often essential
for good performance. This is especially true for DP
learning with limited dataset sizes due to privacy am-
plification results: the uncertainty induced by using
only a batch of the full data augments privacy, when
the identities of the samples in a batch are kept secret
[29, 7, 1, 6, 30]. We therefore want a method for choos-
ing a batch [b] = ∪Ni=1[bi] in the distributed setting s.t.
the full batch is drawn according to a given sampling
scheme and the identity of the batch participants is
kept hidden.
Next, we formulate a general distributed sampling
method that avoids the possibility of a catastrophic
failure and guarantees a graceful degradation of pri-
vacy even in the presence of malicious adversaries. The
main idea is to generate a list of random tokens such
that there are as many tokens as there are observations
in the full joint dataset, and only the owner of a given
token knows who it belongs to.
Given such a list, we can use a simple joint sampling
strategy: the participants jointly generate a seed for a
PRNG, which is used to determine the batch partici-
pants without needing any additional communication.
In case some batch [bi] is empty, the corresponding
party sends only the noise necessary for DP. Note that
this message cannot be distinguished from any other
message, thus keeping the actual batch participants
secret as required for privacy amplification.
To generate the list of tokens, we use Algorithm 2
based on mixnets [9].
Theorem 1. Assume the public-key encryption used
in Algorithm 2 is secure. Then i) the list cannot be
manipulated in nontrivial ways, ii) to hbc parties all
tokens belonging to other parties are indistinguishable
from each other and to malicious parties all tokens be-
longing to hbc parties are indistinguishable from each
other.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Generating the list of random tokens is an expensive
step by itself in terms of communication and compu-
tations, but it suffices to create the list only once since
the owners of the tokens are not revealed at any point
when using the list. The privacy guarantees result-
ing from using the list depend on the actual sampling
scheme used.
3.4.1 Comparison of common sampling
schemes
As noted, the two most used sampling schemes with
privacy amplification are sampling without replace-
ment (SWOR), where the minibatch size b is fixed
and each sample has equal probability b/n of being
selected, and Poisson sampling, where we fix the prob-
ability γ ∈ (0, 1) of independently including each ob-
servation while the batch size varies.
In the distributed setting, SWOR can be done us-
ing Algorithm 2. However, Poisson sampling is also
achievable in a more straightforward manner, since
each client can simply choose to include each sample
independently with the given probability. As shown in
the rest of this Section, when malicious parties control
some of the data and know if they are included in the
batch or not, the simpler Poisson sampling leads to
better privacy amplification than SWOR.
With SWOR, assume we sample a set of b tokens uni-
formly at random from the set of all such sets from
the list of tokens generated with Algorithm 2, and let
γ = b/n, so the mean batch size from Poisson sampling
matches SWOR.
Writing [T ] for the set of T malicious parties, let the to-
tal number of samples controlled by the non-malicious
parties be n¬T =
∑
i6∈[T ] ni. Using SWOR, the actual
number of samples coming from the non-malicious par-
ties now follows a Hypergeometric distribution with
total population size n, total number of successes in
the population n¬T , and number of draws b.
A worst-case amplification factor is then given by bn¬T
i.e., all the samples in a batch come from the non-
malicious parties. However, in most settings this is
a rather unlikely event since the distribution is con-
centrated around the mean bn¬Tn . We can therefore
improve markedly on the worst-case if we admit some
amount of slack in the privacy parameter δ as shown
in Figure 1. However, the amplification factor is still
worse than the baseline given by Poisson sampling
when there are any malicious data holders present.
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
Sa
m
pl
in
g 
fra
ct
io
n Dataset size=50000, batch size=500
with 0 slack (worst-case)
with 1e-15 slack in 
with 1e-10 slack in 
with 1e-05 slack in 
Poisson sampling
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Samples controlled by malicious parties
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
Sa
m
pl
in
g 
fra
ct
io
n Dataset size=50000, batch size=2500
with 0 slack (worst-case)
with 1e-15 slack in 
with 1e-10 slack in 
with 1e-05 slack in 
Poisson sampling
Sampling fractions for privacy amplification
Figure 1: Effective sampling fraction for privacy am-
plification (lower is better). With SWOR, allowing
even for a tiny slack in δ improves markedly over the
worst-case. The sampling fraction for Poisson sam-
pling is not affected by the malicious parties.
3.5 DP random projection
To enable using the methods with even larger models,
we propose using a low-dimensional random embed-
ding instead of the full gradient in learning. Although
the saving is only on uploaded gradients, this presents
the most significant costs as it requires encryption,
whereas downloading the updated parameter values
can be done in the clear due to DP. In the distributed
setting, we do not need to communicate the full pro-
jection matrix but only the seed for a PRNG.
Algorithm 3 DP random projection
Require: Clipped gradient vectors zij ∈ Rd, i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, j ∈ {1, . . . , ni} with sensitivity C, pro-
jection dimension k, projection sensitivity bound
C˜, Gaussian mechanism Gf that is (, δ)-DP on a
sensitivity C˜ query.
1: Generate a projection matrix P ∈ Rd×k s.t. each
element is independently drawn from N (0, 1/k).
2: Sum the projected clipped gradients: z˜ =∑
i
∑
j P
T zij .
3: Return a DP projection Gf (z˜).
We will next show that when a DP mechanism oper-
ates on the k-dimensional representation and the pro-
jection matrix is public, as described in Algorithm 3,
the result is still DP. The result holds for both neigh-
bouring relations ∼R,∼S we consider.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 is (, δ + δ′)-DP, with any
C˜ > 0 and δ′ > 0 s.t.
P
[
Γ(K =
k
2
, θ =
2C2
k
) ≤ C˜2
]
≥ 1− δ′,
where k is the projection dimension, C is the gradient
sensitivity, and Γ is the (shape & scale parameterised)
Gamma distribution.
Proof. See Appendix B for a proof.
To determine the sensitivity bound C˜ in Theorem 2,
we decide on the additional privacy parameter δ′ > 0
and search for the smallest value of C˜ s.t. the condition
in Theorem 2 holds. Then, as stated in the Theorem,
when the Gaussian mechanism we use is (, δ)-DP on
a sensitivity C˜ query, the final result is (, δ + δ′)-DP.
In practice, each client locally runs step (1) in Algo-
rithm 3 with a shared random seed to get the individ-
ual noisy projected gradients and add Gaussian noise
that will sum up to the desired variance as specified
in Section 3.2. The aggregation is then done using
the secure summation as discussed in Section 3.3. Af-
ter receiving the final decrypted sum Gf (z˜), the mas-
ter inverts the projection by calculating PGf (z˜) =
PPT [
∑
i
∑
j zij + ηij ] '
∑
i
∑
j zij + η, where ηij are
the noise terms that sum up to the chosen DP noise
as in (3), and takes an optimization step with the re-
sulting d-dimensional DP approximate gradient.
3.6 Use cases
We focus on two distinct scenarios:
1. Fat clients: N is small, the ni are moderate, the
clients have fair computation and communication
capacities
2. Thin clients: N is large, ni are small, the clients
have more limited computation and communica-
tion capacities
The two main scenarios we consider are motivated by
considering ni, the number of samples per client, and
N , the number of clients. In order to decrease the
effects of the DP noise we need more data, i.e., we need
to increase either ni or N . As the ni grow the benefits
from doing distributed learning start to vanish.
In other words, the most interesting regime for dis-
tributed learning ranges from each client having a sin-
gle sample to each having a moderate amount of data.
As for the number of parties, increasing N naturally
increases the total amount of communication needed
while also limiting the set of practical secure protocols.
A typical example of fat clients is research institutions
or enterprises that possess some amount of data but
would benefit significantly from doing learning on a
larger joint dataset.
A stereotypical case of thin clients is learning with IoT
devices, where the devices we mainly consider would
be e.g. lower-level IoT nodes, which aggregate data
from several simple edge devices.
4 Experiments
As noted earlier, the code for all the experiments is
freely available [20].
We first test our proposed solution for distributed
learning using sampling without replacement and sub-
stitution relation ∼S with CIFAR10 dataset [31] and
a convolutional neural network (CNN): the convolu-
tional part uses 2 convolutional layers (CL) with kernel
size 3, stride 1 and 64 channels, each followed by max
pooling with kernel size 3 and stride 2. After the CL,
the model has 2 fully connected (FC) layers with 384
hidden units each with ReLU and a softmax classifica-
tion layer. The same basic model structure has been
previously used e.g. in [1]. Similarly to [1], we pretrain
the CL weights using the CIFAR100 dataset assumed
to be public and keep them fixed during the training
on private data. However, unlike [1], besides having
a different sampling scheme and neighbourhood rela-
tion, we also initialise the FC layer weights randomly,
and not based on pretraining.
We note that the ∼ 75% accuracy for the non-private
model is not near the state of the art for the CIFAR10
(e.g. [22] reach ∼ 99%); the model architecture was
chosen to illustrate how distributed DP affects the
accuracy in a commonly used and reasonably well-
understood standard model. The actual training is
done using the well-known DP-SGD [40, 1] but using
the privacy accountant of [30]. For testing encryption
speed, we use the MNIST dataset [33] and 2 FC layers
with 536 units each. This model, denoted model 1m,
has ' 106 trainable parameters.
The tests were run on clusters with 2.1GHz Xeon Gold
6230 CPUs. All the tests use 1 core to simulate a
single party. We report the results using our Python
implementation of the algorithms. Run time results
for fat clients can be found in Appendix C.
We use Python’s Secrets module to generate random-
ness in Algorithm 1, which internally utilises urandom
calls. Generating a single 32-bit random integer with
the Secrets module takes about 2.15 ∗ 10−6 seconds.
The values are sent by writing them on a shared disk
without additional symmetric encryption. In real im-
plementations all communications would be done over
the available communication bandwidth using some
standard symmetric encryption such as AES. We do
not include this nor the possible TEE component in
the testing but focus on the feasibility of learning based
on Algorithms 1 and 3.
The baselines for accuracy are given by the centralised
trusted aggregator setting, as well as local DP (LDP)
[14], which means that each participant locally adds
enough noise to protect its contributions without any
encryption scheme. As shown in Figure 2, there is a
tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. However, com-
bining the secure summation protocols with DP, as we
propose, provides significantly better accuracy than is
possible by each party independently protecting their
privacy.
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Figure 2: Mean test accuracy and error bars show-
ing min & max over 5 runs with fat clients on CI-
FAR10 data, δ = 10−5. Our method (DP-SMC, DP-
SMC Poisson) gives significantly better results than
LDP especially in the stricter privacy regime  < 2.
The performance of DP-SMC using either sampling
without replacement (DP-SMC) or Poisson sampling
(DP-SMC Poisson) is indistinguishable from the cen-
tralised scheme with a trusted aggregator that uses
either sampling without replacement (trusted DP) or
Poisson sampling (not shown).
The tradeoff between running times and the security
parameters is shown in Figure 3. The results show
that our solutions can be realistically used for learning
complex models with distributed data.
We can use Algorithm 3 to reduce the computational
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Figure 3: Fold increase in total running time with
varying number of compute nodes for 100 clients, me-
dians over 5 runs. The number of compute nodes can
be tuned to adjust the tradeoff between security and
running time. Using MNIST data, model 1m has 2 FC
hidden layers with ' 1e6 parameters.
burden due to cryptography and the amount of com-
munication needed at the cost of having to generate
projection matrices and losing some prediction accu-
racy. As shown in Figure 4, even with very large sav-
ings on communication and decreased runtime, we still
incur only modest decrease in accuracy.
5 Related work
There is a wealth of papers on distributed DP with se-
cure summation as witnessed by a recent survey [18],
many of which are relevant also for DP federated learn-
ing. The problem of distributed DP was first formu-
lated in [16], who propose to generate DP noise col-
laboratively using a SMC protocol. The idea of using
a general SMC for distributed DP has been more re-
cently considered e.g. in [26]. The main drawback
with these methods is the computational burden.
The first practical method for implementing DP
queries in a distributed manner was the distributed
Laplace mechanism presented in [37]. Closely related
methods have been commonly used in the literature
ever since [39, 2, 18, 21, 25], including in this work.
There has been much new work on distributed learn-
ing in the FL setting [35], as evidenced by a recent
survey [28]. Most of the work has concentrated on the
cross device case with typically millions of clients each
holding at most a few samples. Meanwhile, the cross-
silo setting has seen significantly fewer contributions,
especially focusing on privacy.
Of the closest existing work, in [10] the authors con-
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Figure 4: Mean test accuracy and error bars showing
min & max over 5 runs using only low-dimensional em-
beddings vs. fold decrease in total running time, Pois-
son sampling (1.7, 10−5)-DP with 8 compute nodes.
The full model has d ' 9 · 105 parameters. Accu-
racy is close to the original even with very low projec-
tion dimensionality k. Low dimensionality has marked
advance in total runtime and requires communicating
several orders of magnitude less encrypted values.
sider privacy in cross-silo FL setting without DP, but
their approach lacks any formal privacy guarantees.
In [46] the focus is on deriving results for training
models on the clients’ local data under DP, where the
privacy guarantees are derived directly on the com-
municated parameters instead of gradients. However,
all the reported experimental results use privacy bud-
gets that are completely vacuous in practice ( ≥ 50).
[43] concentrates on training several ML models in
the cross-silo FL setting with DP. Their solution uses
essentially the same distributed noise generation but
slower encryption, does not use TEEs nor address sam-
pling schemes other than the distributed Poisson sam-
pling. They also do not consider communicating low-
dimensional embeddings.
TEEs have recently been gaining popularity in ma-
chine learning literature. Privacy-preserving machine
learning using TEEs was proposed in [36], who dis-
cuss security of enclaves especially against data ac-
cess pattern leaks. [11] concentrate on memory access
leaks in SGX, whereas [4] propose a new DP defini-
tion to account for the possible privacy breaches re-
sulting from data and memory access leaks. [24] focus
on how to implement efficient operations needed for a
ML framework built on TEEs and DP. Several recent
papers have investigated efficient execution of DNNs
and other models in TEEs [42, 23, 19, 32].
6 Conclusion
We have presented two methods for cross-silo FL with
strict privacy-guarantees based on fast homomorphic
encryption and distributed noise addition, and shown
empirically that they can be used for learning complex
models like neural networks with reasonable running
times. Finally, we have shown how the scale the meth-
ods to even larger models by using random projections
while incurring only modest cost in terms of prediction
accuracy.
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Appendix A
This Appendix contains the secure summation proto-
col and related discussion for fat clients.
Secure summation with fat clients
For secure summation with fat clients, we use an ad-
ditively homomorphic encryption scheme given in Al-
gorithm 4.
The algorithm was originally introduced in [8], uses
fixed-point representation of real numbers, and is
based on fast modulo-addition.
Algorithm 4 Secure summation for fat clients
Require: Upper bound for the total sum R (public);
yi integer held by party i, i = 1, . . . , N ;
Pairwise secret keys kij held by party i, i, j =
1, . . . , N, i 6= j s.t. kij + kji = 0 mod R .
Ensure: Securely calculated sum
∑N
i=1 yi.
1: Each client i calculates Enc(yi, ki, R) = yi + ki =
yi +
∑
j 6=i kij mod R, and sends the result to the
aggregator.
2: After receiving messages from all other parties, the
aggregator broadcasts the sum
∑N
i=1
∑
j 6=i yi+kij
mod R =
∑N
i=1 yi.
Here we assume the parties are TEEs but this is not
essential for the protocol. We assume one of the TEEs
acts as an untrusted aggregator, who does the ac-
tual summations and broadcasts the results to the
other TEEs but otherwise has no special informa-
tion or capabilities. Without implementing e.g. some
zero-knowledge proof of validity, the aggregator might
change the final result at will if the TEE is compro-
mised. However, this can usually be detected post hoc
by each TEE by comparing the jointly trained model
to the model trained on their private data. The role
of the master could also be randomised or duplicated
if deemed necessary.
For the secure DP summation, the TEEs encrypt yi =
zi+ηi where ηi is DP noise as in the main text’s Section
3.22.
To generate the secret keys kij , for each round a sep-
arate setup phase is needed, which can be done with
O(N2) messages e.g. using standard Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange [13] or existing public key cryptography.
The actual values for each iteration can be drawn from
the discrete uniform distribution bounded by R us-
ing a cryptographically secure pseudorandom genera-
tor (CSPRNG) [18] initialised with a seed shared by
each pair of TEEs. Since each individual’s value is
protected by all pairwise keys, the method is secure as
long as there are at most N − 2 compromised TEEs.
We refer to [8] and [2] for more details.
2 Note that the actual sum is unbounded with a Gaus-
sian noise term for DP. However, we can always clip the
values to the assumed range since post-processing does not
affect the DP guarantees.
Appendix B
This Appendix contains all the proofs omitted from
the main text. For convenience, we first state the the-
orems again and then proceed with the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Assume the public-key encryption used
in Algorithm 2 is secure. Then i) the list cannot be
manipulated in non-trivial ways, ii) to hbc parties all
tokens belonging to other parties are indistinguishable
from each other and to malicious parties all tokens be-
longing to hbc parties are indistinguishable from each
other.
Proof. To begin with, since the encryption is secure,
an attacker cannot deduce the true ciphertext at layer
i by seeing the unencrypted plaintext at layer i+1, i =
1, . . . , N − 1.
For i), since after each iteration (4) in the for-loop any
party can check if its tokens are still included on the
list and that the list size has not changed, the only
manipulation that can be done without alerting some
hbc party is to tamper with the tokens of the malicious
parties without changing their total number. Since
these parties can in any case decide their contribution
to learning without regarding the tokens, manipulating
these tokens cannot gain anything.
As for ii), w.l.o.g. assume hbc parties at iterations i
and j, i < j in the for-loop (3). For j, since i fol-
lows the protocol the resulting list after iteration i of
(4) looks like random numbers with a random per-
mutation, so all elements not belonging to j are in-
distinguishable from each other. For i, even if i can
identify all elements on the list after iteration i of the
for-loop, after iteration j the list again looks like a ran-
dom permutation of random numbers since j follows
the protocol. Furthermore, after iteration i the entries
belonging to the hbc parties look like random numbers
with a random permutation to any malicious parties
and as such are indistinguishable from each other to
any malicious party from this iteration onwards.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 is (, δ + δ′)-DP, with any
C˜ > 0 and δ′ > 0 s.t.
P
[
Γ(K =
k
2
, θ =
2C2
k
) ≤ C˜2
]
≥ 1− δ′,
where k is the projection dimension, C is the gradient
sensitivity, and Γ is the (shape & scale parameterised)
Gamma distribution.
Proof. Let fJL(a) = P
Ta be the projection with
each element in P ∈ Rd×k independently drawn from
N (0, 1/k). We need to show that fJL is (C˜, δ′)-
sensitive (Definition 2.4), and the result then follows
directly from Lemma 2.1.
Consider first the neighbouring relation ∼R. The sums
of clipped gradients originating from maximally differ-
ent data sets D ∼R D′ differ in one vector, w.l.o.g.
denoted as a ∈ Rd, ‖a‖2 ≤ C. As the coupling re-
quired by Definition 2.4, we use a trivial independent
coupling, so we have X −X ′ = fJL(a) = PTa.
Writing N , χ2 for random variables following normal
and chi-squared distributions, respectively, we there-
fore have
‖X −X ′‖22 = ‖PTa‖22 (4)
=
k∑
j=1
[
d∑
i=1
aiN (0, 1/k)]2 (5)
=
‖a‖22
k
χ2k (6)
≤ C
2
k
χ2k. (7)
Looking at Definition 2.4, we see that fJL is (C˜, δ
′)-
sensitive, when
P
[
Γ(K =
k
2
, θ =
2C2
k
) ≤ C˜2
]
≥ 1− δ′. (8)
The fact that Algorithm 3 is (, δ+δ′)-DP then follows
from Lemma 2.1.
When using the neighbouring relation∼S and constant
C/2 for clipping the gradients, the gradients originat-
ing from the maximally different data sets D ∼S D′
again differ at most in a vector a s.t. ‖a‖2 ≤ C.
The privacy analysis of the mechanism Gf is then car-
ried out using the techniques given in [30] and we get
the (, δ)-bound for Gf using the projection sensitivity
bound C˜, so again Algorithm 3 is (, δ + δ′)-DP for δ′
that satisfies 8.
Appendix C
This Appendix contains the experimental results for
fat clients, i.e., using Algorithm 4 for encryption, omit-
ted from the main text.
Implementation details and more
experimental results
To generate randomness with a CSPRNG required in
Algorithm 4, we use Blake2 [5], a fast cryptographic
hash function, on an initial pairwise shared secret to-
gether with a running number. On 2.1GHz Xeon Gold
6230, generating one 4 byte hash digest with Blake2
takes about 1.2 ∗ 10−6 seconds.
The tradeoff between running times and the security
parameters corresponding to the main text’s Figure 3
is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Fold increase in total running time with
varying number of clients, medians over 5 runs. En-
cryption time depends on the chosen pairwise group
size: even with increasing number of clients the en-
cryption time stays roughly constant with a fixed
group size (horizontal lines). Using MNIST data,
model 1m has 2 FC hidden layers with ' 1e6 param-
eters.
